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enon in this closed loop (such as the force generated by a muscle) persists in time, effectively averaging the antecedent causes over some period, the character of the system-environment relationship changes completely-cause and effect lose their distinctness and one must treat the closed loop as a whole rather than sequentially. That is where feedback theory enters the picture. Feedback theory provides the method for obtaining a correct intuitive grasp of this closed-loop situation in the many situations where the old open-loop analysis leads intuition astray.
In this article I intend to show as clearly as I can how a new theoretical approach to behavior can be developed simply by paying attention to feedback effects. There is nothing subtle about these effects; they are hidden only if they are taken for granted. All behavior involves strong feedback effects, whether one is considering spinal reflexes or self-actualization. Feedback is such an all-pervasive and fundamental aspect of behavior that it is as invisible as the air we breathe. Quite literally it is behavior-we know nothing of our own behavior but the feedback effects of our own outputs. To behave is to control perception.
I will not try here to develop all these concepts fully; that is being done elsewhere (2). I will provide only some essential groundwork by discussing the development of a hierarchical controlsystem model of behavioral organization beginning wtih the same sort of elementary observations that led to behaviorism. I hope it will thus become evident that a fully developed feedback model can do what no behavioristic model has been able to do: it can restore purposes and goals to our concept of human behavior, in a way that does not violate direct experience or scientific methods. The human brain is not simply a switchboard by means of which one environmental event is connected to another environmental event. These ideas are not new, but perhaps my synthesis is.
Act versus Result
Behaviorists speak of organisms "emitting" behavior under stimulus control, this control being established by use of reinforcing stimuli. The effectiveness of reinforcers cannot be denied, but behavior itself has not been thoroughly analyzed by behaviorists. Behaviorists have not distinguished between means and ends-acts and results (3)-because they have not used the model that is appropriate to behavior.
When a pigeon is trained to walk in a figure-eight pattern, there are at least two levels at which the behavior must be viewed. The first, which is the one to which the behaviorist attends, is that of the pattern which results from the pigeon's walking movements. The other consists of those movements themselves (4).
The figure eight is created by the walking movements: the act of walking produces the result of a figure-eight pattern in the observer's perceptions. The observer sees a consistent behavior that remains the same from trial to trial. He generally fails to notice, however, that this constant result is brought about by a constantly changing set of walking movements. Clearly, the figureeight pattern is not simply "emitted."
As the pigeon traces out the figure eight over and over, its feet are placed differently on each repeat of the same point in the pattern. If the cage is tipped, the movements become still more changed, yet the pattern which results remains the same. Variable acts produce a constant result. In this case the variations may not be striking, but they exist.
As behaviors become more complex the decoupling of act and result becomes even more marked. A rat trained to press a lever when a stimulus light appears will accomplish that result with a good reliability, yet each onset of the stimulus light produces a different act. If the rat is left of the lever it moves right; if right it moves left. If the paw is beside the lever the paw is lifted; if the paw is on the lever it is pressed down. These different, even opposite, acts follow the same stimulus event.
Reference signal Fig. 1. Basic control-system In doing so it produces whatever output is required to prevent disturbances from affecting the sensor signal materially. Thus the output quantity becomes primarily a function of the disturbance, while the sensor signal and input quantity become primarily a function of the reference signal originated inside the system. For all systems organized in this way, the "response" to a "stimulus" can be predicted if the stabilized state of the input quantity is known; the stimulus-response law is then a function of environmental properties and scarcely at all of system properties.
The more closely the rat's acts are examined, the more variability is seen. Yet in every case the variations in the acts have a common effect: they lead toward the final result that repeats every time. In fact, if precisely those variations did not occur, the final result would not be the same every time. Somehow the different effects apparently caused by the stimulus light are exactly those required to compensate for differences in initial conditions on each trial. This situation was clearly recognized by the noted philosopher of behaviorism, Egon Brunswik (5).
The accepted explanation for this phenomenon of compensation is that the changed initial conditions provide "cues," changes in the general background stimuli, which somehow modify the effect of the main stimulus in the right way. There are three main problems created by this explanation. First, these hypothetical "cues" must act with quantitative accuracy on the nervous system employing muscles which, because they are subject to fatigue, give anything but a quantitative response to nerve impulses. Second, these "cues" are hypothetical. They are never experimentally elucidated in toto, and there are many cases in which one cannot see how any cue but the behavioral result itself could be sensed. Third, the compensation explanation cannot deal with successful accomplishment of the behavioral result in a novel situation, where presumably there has been no opportunity for new "cues" to attain control of responses.
The central fact that needs explanation is the mysterious fashion in which actions vary in just the way needed to 352 keep the behavioral result constant. The "cue" hypothesis comes after the fact and overlooks too many practical difficulties to be accepted with any comfort. Yet what is the alternative? It is to conclude that acts vary in order to create a constant behavioral result. That implies purpose: the purpose of acts is to produce the result that is in fact observed. This is the alternative which I recommend accepting.
Feedback Control
Behaviorists have rejected purposes or goals in behavior because it has seemed that goals are neither observable nor essential. I will show that they are both. There can be no rational explanation of behavior that overlooks the overriding influence of an organism's present structure of goals (whatever its origins), and there can be no nontrivial description of responses to stimuli that leaves out purposes. When purposes are properly understood in terms of feedback phenomena, acts and results are seen to be lawfully related in a simple and direct way. We will see this relationship using a simple canonical model of a feedback control system. Engineers use negative feedback control systems to hold some physical quantity in a predetermined state, in an environment containing sources of disturbance that tend to change the quantity when it is uncontrolled. Every control system of this kind must have certain major features. It must sense the controlled quantity in each dimension in which the quantity is to be controlled (Sensor function in Fig. 1) ; this implies the presence of an inner representation of the quantity in the form of a signal or set of signals. It must contain or be given something equivalent to a reference signal (or multiple reference signals) which specifies the "desired" state of the controlled quantity. The sensor signal and the reference signal must be compared, and the resulting error signal must actuate the system's output effectors or outputs. And finally, the system's outputs must be able to affect the controlled quantity in each dimension that is to be controlled. There are other arrangements equivalent to this, but this one makes the action the clearest.
This physical arrangement of components is further constrained by the requirement that the system always oppose disturbances tending to create a nonzero error signal; this is tantamount to saying that the system must be organized for negative (not positive) feedback, and that it must be dynamically stable-it must not itself create errors that keep it "hunting" about the final steady-state condition. There is no point in concern with unstable systems, because the (normal) behavior we wish to explain does not show the symptoms of dynamic instability-and we do not have to design the system. This system is modeled after Wiener's original concept (6). In the system I describe, however, there are certain changes in geometry, particularly the placement of the system boundary and the identification of the sensor (not reference) signal as the immediate consequence of a stimulus input. This is a continuous-variable (analog) model, without provision for learning.
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A system that meets these requirements behaves in a basically simple way, despite the complexities of design that may be required in order to achieve stable operation. It produces whatever output is required in order to cancel the effects of disturbances on the signal generated by the sensor. If the properties of the sensor remain constant, as we may usually assume, the result is to protect the controlled quantity against the effects of unpredictable disturbances of almost any origin.
Goal-Directed Behavior
The reference signal constitutes an explanation of how a goal can be determined by physical means. The reference signal is a model inside the behaving system against which the sensor signal is compared; behavior is always such as to keep the sensor signal close to the setting of this reference signal.
With this model we gain a new insight into so-called "goal-seeking" behavior. The usual concept of a goal [for example, William Ashby's treatment (7)] is something toward which behavior tends over some protracted period of time. We can see that idea now as describing the behavior of a sluggish control system, or a control system immediately after an overwhelming disturbance. Many complex control systems are sluggish, but only because any faster action would lead to dynamic instability. The appearance of "working toward" a goal may result from nothing more than our viewing the system on an inappropriately fast time scale.
It is useful to separate what a control system does from how it does what it does. Given two control systems controlling the same quantity with respect to the same reference signal, one system might be able to resist disturbances lasting only 0.1 second while the other could not oppose a disturbance lasting less than 1 second. After a disturbance, one system might restore its error signal nearly to zero in one swift move, while the other makes that correction slowly and after several over-and undershoots of the final steady-state condition. These are dynamic differences, and have to do with the details of system design. Both systems, however, do the same thing when viewed on a slow enough time scale: they control a given quantity, opposing disturbances tending to affect that quantity. On a time scale 26 JANUARY 1973 where we can see one system "working toward" the goal state, we might see the other as never allowing significant error to occur-as reacting simultaneously with the disturbance to cancel its effects.
The proper time scale for observing what a control system does is that on which the response to an impulse-disturbance is apparently zero. That automatically restricts our observations of disturbances in the same way: all disturbances appear to be slow. On such a slow time scale, it is apparent that a control system keeps its sensor signal nearly matching its reference signal by producing outputs equal and opposite to disturbances, in terms of effects on the controlled quantity.
The normal behavior of a good control system, viewed on the appropriate time scale, is therefore not goal-seeking behavior but goal-maintaining behavior. The sensor signal is maintained in a particular goal state as long as the system is operating within its normal range, in the environment to which its organization is matched. If the properties of the sensor do not change, this control action results in the external controlled quantity being maintained in a state we may term its reference level.
Much of what we interpret as a long process of goal-seeking (and perhaps all) can be shown to result from higherorder goal maintenance that involves a program of shifting lower-order reference levels, but that anticipates what has yet to be developed here.
Controlled Quantities
The key concept in this model, as far as observable behavior is concerned, is that of the controlled quantity. If it were possible to identify a controlled quantity and its apparent reference level, the model just given would provide an adequate physical explanation for existence of this quantity and its goal state, just as the telephone-switchboard model of the brain has heretofore been taken as an adequate physical explanation for stimulus-response phenomena. To be sure, the source of the reference signal that sets the system's goal remains unspecified, but that is of no consequence in a part-model of a specific behavior pattern. We are concerned here with immediate causation, not ultimate causes.
If a quantity is under feedback control by some control system, that fact can be discovered by a simple (in principle) procedure, based on the fact that the system will oppose disturbances of the controlled quantity.
Suppose Defining the zero points of the controlled quantity and the system's output as their undisturbed values, we can see that the controlled quantity will remain nearly at its zero point (Aq. 0), while the disturbance and the system's output will be related by the approxi-
Here is a very simple example. Suppose we observe a soldier at attention, and guess that one controlled quantity involved in his behavior is the vertical orientation of one of his arms, seemingly being held in a straight-down position (the zero point). If this quantity were not under active control, we could predict that a sideways force of 1 kilogram would raise the arm to about a 30-degree angle from the vertical. Applying the force, we observe that in fact the arm moves only 1 degree, or 1/30 of the predicted amount. The effective force-output of the soldier is thus just a trifle under 1 kilogram in a direction opposite to our 1-kilogram disturbance, the trifle being the restoring force due to the slightly deflected mass of the arm, and gravity. This is a reasonable verification of the initial guess, and we may claim to have found a control system in the soldier by identifying its controlled quantity.
The reference level of a controlled quantity can better be defined as its value when the system's output is totally unopposed (even by friction or gravity). Because that state normally implies no error-correcting output, the reference level of the controlled quantity can also be defined as that level (state, for multidimensional quantities) which results in zero error-correcting output.
A controlled quantity need not have a reference level of zero. The soldier, for example, might be persuaded to raise his arm to the horizontal position, so that in the same coordinate system used before, the apparent reference position is now 90 degrees. The weight of the arm now constitutes a natural disturbance, and we would guess that the system's output is now equivalent to an upward force equal to the weight of the arm. If that force were 10 kilograms, we would also predict that an upward force disturbance of 10 kilograms would cause the arm muscles to relax completely, or at least that the net force-output would drop to zero (arm muscles can oppose one another). Our pushing upward with a force of 11 kilograms should result in an output of /2 kilogram downward.
Hierarchies of Controlled Quantities
Suppose that the soldier is now ordered to point at a passing helicopter. He will raise his arm and do so. We can verify that arm position is still a controlled quantity by applying forcedisturbances, but now the picture is complicated. The test still works for relatively brief (but not too brief) disturbances, but over a period of some seconds we find that arm position does not remain constant. Instead, it moves slowly and uniformly upward and sideways, as the helicopter approaches.
This suggests that a second con- The answer is obvious. The second control system opposes disturbances not by direct activation of force outputs, but by altering the reference level, by means of changing the reference signal for the arm-position control system. Now two controlled quantities (and implied control systems) exist in a relationship that is clearly hierarchical. One controlled quantity is controlled by means of changing the reference level with respect to which a second quantity is controlled. This immediately suggests a partial answer to the question raised by Fig.  1 : Where does the reference signal come from? It is clearly the output of a higher-order control system, a system that senses a different kind of quantity and controls it with respect to an appropriate reference signal by using the whole lower-order system as its means of error prevention (the appropriate time scale for the higherorder system will be slower than that for the lower).
We now have a plausible physical model for a two-level structure of goals. The goal of pointing is achieved by setting-and altering-a goal for arm position. In fact the higher-order critical variables and which I term intrinsic quantities. These are the quantities affected by deprivation and subsequent reinforcements that erase, or at least diminish, the errors caused by deprivation. This makes the highest order of reference levels into those extremely generalized ones that are inherited as the basic conditions for survival. But that takes us to the verge of learning theory, which is beyond the intent of this article. Briefly, I view the process of reorganization itself as the error-driven "output" of a basic inherited control system which is ultimately responsible for the particular structure of an adult's behavioral control system (8). For a human being, the "intrinsic reference levels" probably specify far more than mere food or water intake. We cannot arbitrarily rule out any goal at this level-not even goals such as "self-actualization."
Implications for Behaviorism
The most important implication of this analysis for the traditional view of cause and effect in behavior lies in the fact that control systems control what they sense, not really what they do. In the total absence of disturbances, a control system hardly needs to do anything in order to keep a controlled quantity at a reference level, even a changing reference level. By far the largest portion of output effort is reserved for opposing disturbances. This is expressed in the approximate
relationship, g(d) -h(o)
. Because of the way negative feedback control systems are organized, the system's output is caused to vary in almost exact opposition to the effects of disturbances-the chief determinant of output is thus the disturbance. If we read "stimulus" for disturbance and "response" for some measure of output, stimulus-response phenomena fall into place within the feedback model. Stimuli do cause responses. If one knew the controlled quantity associated with a given stimulus-response pair, one would see more regularity in the relationship, not less. In fact one would see an exact quantitative relationship, for the effects of the response on the controlled quantity must come close to canceling the effects of the stimulus on that same quantity, and both these effects are mediated through the environment, where the detailed physical relationships can be seen. That implies, of course, that given knowledge of 26 JANUARY 1973 the controlled quantity one can deduce the form of stimulus-response relationships from physical, not behavioral laws (9).
Knowledge of the controlled quantity makes the stimulus-response relationship even clearer by pointing out the right response measure and the right measure of the disturbance, or stimulus. An organism's muscle efforts produce many consequent effects, no one of which can be chosen on the basis of behavioristic principles as being a "better" measure than any other. A stimulus event impinges on an organism and its surroundings in many ways and via many paths, again undistinguishable under the philosophy of behaviorism. Knowledge of the controlled quantity eliminates irrelevant measures of stimulus and response.
Let us consider a rat in a Skinner box. The rat responds to a light by pressing a lever for food. Whatever the immediate controlled quantity may be, it is clearly not affected by the cutrrent that flows to the apparatus when the lever is depressed: opening the circuit will not in any way alter the rat's next press of the lever. But holding the rat back with a dragharness as it moves toward the lever would create immediate forward-pushing efforts, so we would know that the rat's "motion" is close to a controlled quantity. We would of course try to do better than that.
Even though the current to the experimental apparatus does affect the appearance of food, which is quite likely to be a controlled quantity (q,), the current is still not a controlled quantity, for we could leave the circuit open and actuate the food dispenser in a different way, and the rat would still do nothing in opposition, nothing to restore the current. There is no need to assume what is controlled except as a starting hypothesis, and this method can disprove wrong hypotheses.
The irrelevance of some stimulus measures is common knowledge; rats, for instance, have been found to respond quite well to a burned-out stimulus light, provided that the actuating relay still clicked loudly enough.
Systematic experimental definition of controlled quantities will eliminate irrelevant side effects of stimuli and responses from consideration. But it will also negate the significance of most stimulus-response laws, for once a controlled quantity has been identified reasonably well, a whole family of stimulus-response laws becomes trivially predictable. Once it is known why a given response follows a given stimulus, further examples become redundant. Knowing why means knowing what is being controlled, and knowing the reference level.
When a controlled quantity is found, variability of behavior is drastically lowered, simply because one no longer considers irrelevant details. The remaining variability is lowered even further as one explores the hierarchy of controlled quantities. If all we observed about the soldier in the example were his force outputs, we would have to fall back on statistics to predict them. If we then understood that the soldier was using these outputs to control arm position we could find many cases in which there would be scarcely any variability; applying the correct stimuli (forces) would result in quantitatively predictable force outputs. There would still be many unpredicted changes, but a good fraction of those would become precisely predictable if we understood that the soldier was using arm position in order to point at a specific moving object. Of course as we push toward higher and higher orders of control organization we will find more complex systems employing many lower-order systems at once so that prediction depends on our determining which of several apparently equivalent subsystems will be employed. In principle, however, we can become as thoroughly acquainted with one individual's structure of controlled quantities as we please, if cooperation continues to satisfy his higher-order goals.
Control systems, or organisms, control what they sense. The application of a disturbing stimulus does not affect for long what matters to the organism at the same level as the disturbance, because the organism will alter its lower-order goals in such a way as to cancel the effects of the disturbance. If a position disturbance is applied, the organism will alter its force goals and prevent disturbance of position. If a relative position disturbance (movement of the helicopter) is applied, the organism will alter its absolute position goals and prevent disturbance of relative position.
In this way the system continues to oppose disturbances, making adjustments at every level in the hierarchy of control. The organism will not let you (the experimenter) alter what it senses (if it can prevent it), but it will without hesitation alter the very same quantity itself in order to prevent the experimenter's disturbing a higher-order controlled quantity. Hence the wellknown perversity of experimental subjects! It is this hierarchical character of control systems that makes it seem that organisms value self-determinism. And that is not only appearance: organisms are self-determined in terms of inner control of what they sense, at every level of organization except the highest level.
Only overwhelming force or insuperable obstacles can cause an organism to give up control of what it senses, and that is true at every level. In order to achieve ultimate control over behavior, one must obtain the power to deprive the organism of something its genes tell it it must have, and make restoration contingent on the organism's setting particular goals in the hierarchy of learned systems, or even on acquiring new control systems. The apparent purposefulness of variations of behavioral acts can be accepted as fact in the framework of a control-system model of behavior. A control system, properly organized for its environment, will produce whatever output is required in order to achieve a constant sensed result, even in the presence of unpredictable disturbances. A control-system model of the brain provides a physical explanation for the existence of goals or purposes, and shows that behavior is the control of input, not output.
A systematic investigation of controlled quantities can reveal an organism's structure of control systems. The structure is hierarchical, in that some quantities are controlled as the means for controlling higher-order quantities. The output of a higherorder system is not a muscle force, but a reference level (variable) for a lower-order controlled quantity. The highest-order reference levels are inherited and are associated with the meta-behavior termed reorganization.
When controlled quantities are discovered, the related stimulus-response laws become trivially predictable. VariSummary Consistent behavior patterns are created by variable acts, and generally repeat only because detailed acts change. The accepted explanation of this paradox, that "cues" cause the changes, is irrelevant; it is unsupported by evidence, and incapable of dealing with novel situations.
The apparent purposefulness of variations of behavioral acts can be accepted as fact in the framework of a control-system model of behavior. A control system, properly organized for its environment, will produce whatever output is required in order to achieve a constant sensed result, even in the presence of unpredictable disturbances. A control-system model of the brain provides a physical explanation for the existence of goals or purposes, and shows that behavior is the control of input, not output.
When controlled quantities are discovered, the related stimulus-response laws become trivially predictable. Variability of behavior all but disappears once controlled quantities are known. Behavior itself is seen in terms of this model to be self-determined in a specific and highly significant sense that calls into serious doubt the ultimate feasibility of operant conditioning of human beings by other human beings.
